Introduction
Ethiopia has one of the largest diaspora populations in the world. Although the exact number is yet to be known the government and some scholars estimate that more than two million Ethiopians live in the Middle East, Europe and North America (Lyons 2009 ). The paper examines the transnational politics of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora in Europe and North America. Muslims despite them being the second largest religious group constituting 34% of Ethiopia's 80 million people, have been one of the country's historic minorities with a low level of political participation and a high degree of social discrimination by the country's dominant Christian elite. Although the political reforms since the 1974 revolution have to some extent redressed the issue of religious equality a lot remains to be desired before the Ethiopian national identity is reconstituted on a more inclusive basis. The paper argues that the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora, through rights based advocacy, are actively engaged in enhancing the wider game of democratic politics in Ethiopia. A closer examination of the tone of their rights advocacy and the symmetric collaboration between the diaspora and Muslims in Ethiopia also challenges the indiscriminate labeling of the diaspora as 'intransigent', 'hegemonic' and 'conflict actors', by the long distance nationalism framework in transnational studies.
The paper consists of five sections. Section one briefly reviews the literature on the nature of the transnational politics of the diaspora. Section two sets the homeland scene with background information of major religious groups and their relationship with the Ethiopian state in the longue duree. Section three provides an overview of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora organizations; their transnational activities and the media they use to reach out to Muslims in Ethiopia, members of other religious groups, and the country's political leadership. Section four examines the discursive practices and direct involvement of the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora in their country of origin. The last part offers concluding remarks on the peace building dimension of the diaspora groups that challenges the negativity often attributed to diaspora within the framework of long distance nationalism.
Diaspora and their Transnational Politics -a Review of Literature
Four approaches are discernable from the literature of diaspora and their transnational politics.
The first, and the most dominant, perspective is the conceptual framework of long-distance nationalism. Pioneered by Benedict Anderson (1992) , long-distance nationalism depicts the F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 4 diaspora as a particular form of subject bent on advancing radical view points on homeland socio-political conflicts. Accordingly, the intransigency of the diaspora emanate from the unique decoupling of action from its consequences. Located far in the comfort zone of the host countries the diaspora are supposed to indulge in radicalization of conflicts in their country of origin rather than working towards a negotiated settlement of social and political conflict. Examples of diaspora funding conflict in their home countries abound in the literature such as the behavior of the Serbian Diaspora before and during the Balkan wars (Blitz 1996) and the active involvement of the Tamil diaspora in the continuation of civil war in Sirilanka (Chalk 2008) . Building on the works of Anderson, Demmers (2002:10) has recently noted, 'by long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, diaspora communities are engaged in a sort of virtual conflict: they live their conflicts through the internet, email, television, and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks, or accountability. Therefore, they are engaged in processes of conflict dynamics that differ importantly from their identity group members in their homelands'. Referring to the contribution of the diaspora to the 2005 post election violence in Ethiopia, Lyons (2009:589) also concurred with the general tenets of long distance nationalism: 'Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate conflicts' protractedness […] This tendency to frame the homeland conflict in categorical, hard-line terms strengthens confrontational homeland leaders and organizations and undermines others seeking compromise'. Diasporas, like any other set of actors, can be simultaneously "peace-makers" and "peacebreakers". But much of the existing literature tends to concentrate on the negative aspects and influences exerted by diasporas on conflict situations (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009: 5) .
Responding to the criticism of the singular focus on the negative sides of the transnational diaspora politics more recent contributions argue that diaspora can also contribute positively to peace building processes by engaging in initiatives that either directly promote profitable dialogue processes or indirectly contribute to economic and social advancement, thus creating the grounds for sustainable peace (Warnecke 2010) . Specifically, two positive dimensions of the diaspora have got attention in the recent works. One is remittance. The sheer magnitude of remittances sent by the diaspora to their country of origin has led many national, international and intergovernmental institutions to develop a commitment in this field by making it an explicit policy interest. The European Commission, for instance, has recognized diasporas as being 'actors of home country development' and identified a number of initiatives and recommendations to facilitate their direct involvement (EC 2005: 6) . 
The Homeland Scene -Religious Groups vis a vis the Ethiopian State
There are three major religious groups in Ethiopia: the followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), Muslims, and Protestants (evangelical Christians). The origin of Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopian dates back to the 4 th AD when King Ezana of the Axumite kingdom was converted into Christianity in 334 AD (Tadesse 1972 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 the Ethiopian polity, where they were regarded as second class citizens at best and 'foreigners' at worst. Muslims in northern Ethiopia were not allowed to own land and they were as such forced to take up commerce and craftsmanship to make a living. Some Ethiopian
Christian emperors had also sought to build a nation through political centralization and religious homogenization. These emperors in fact 'attempted to formally proscribe the practice of Islamic religion, endeavoring to enforce mass conversion to Christianity to enhance national unity' (Abbink 1998: 115) .
The socio-political reforms brought by the 1974 revolution and the end of the Christian monarchy partly redressed the marginalization of Muslim within Ethiopian society (Hussein 2006 (Carmichael 1997) . Freedom of association has meant that Islam in Ethiopia, for the first time, has got a legal organizational expression. Religious equality is expressed in the construction of many mosques, though this has in some areas provoked strong Christian resistance and religious conflicts (Ostebo 2008) . Liberalization of the press has also meant the emergence of Islamic publishing houses (Hussein 1998) . Enthusiastically joining Bush's 'coalition of the willing', the Ethiopian government has sought to reposition itself and regain its strategic importance to the US led post-cold war global order. Adapting and reacting to this global discourse the EPRDF has managed to extract tremendous economic resources (development aid) and the much needed political legitimacy from the west despite its poor record on human right and political repression 1 .
Ethiopia The 1995 Constitution, on the other hand, has generously provided for religious freedom.
Taking advantage of the constitutionally enshrined religious and associational rights, the Muslims reorganized the Mejlis; attained legal recognition, and a new leadership was elected. Many Muslims are still skeptical about the new leadership, who they think was 'selected' by the EPRDF instead of assuming power through a competitive election.
The Making of the Ethiopian Muslims diaspora
The push factors for many of the Ethiopian diaspora are violent political conflicts since the 1970s. For others, international migration is the only means to improve their economic conditions. The preferred destinations of the Ethiopian migrants are Europe, North America and the Gulf countries. The diaspora has been actively involved in homeland affairs. It is the opposition parties' main constituency and the main source of finance (Lyons 2009 ). In recent years the government has also sought to create its own diaspora consistency. It has initiated a series of laws and directives to better 'govern' the structurally elusive diaspora, and tap into its financial resources for developmental purposes. Towards that end, the government to Najashi's conversion (Hussein 1998; Ahmedin 2011) . For these scholars and Muslim activists, the 'denial' is part of establishing the Christian hegemony in Ethiopia as if Ethiopia In Islamic history and tradition, Ethiopia is known as the "haven of the First Migration or Hijra". For Muslims, Ethiopia is synonymous with freedom from persecution and emancipation from fear. Ethiopia was a land where its king, Al-Najashi, was a person renowned for justice and in whose land human rights were cherished. The first migration of the Companions and relatives of the Prophet Muhammad to Ethiopia celebrates the birth of freedom of expression and beliefs, whereas, the Second migration of the prophet Muhammad to the medina celebrates the end of oppression 5 .
Re-constructing the nation on inclusive basis
The (Brooks 1996) .
The followers of the Orthodox Church also produce evidence for the 'divine favor' by referring to the fact that Ethiopia is mentioned more than forty times in the bible (Ullendorf 1968) . As Abbink (1998: 113) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Muslims to claim a higher social status within the Ummah.
The call for autonomous community association
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Religious conflict resolution
One of the enduring legacies of the delegation is the peace it brokered between the feuding ulama and the way it eased the simmering sectarian tension among the Ethiopian Muslims. At the time the delegation arrived in the country, the ulama were divided between 'the Sufi' i.e., that all issues would be discussed within the framework of the four Islamic schools of thought. The discussion was held once in a week for three months and the membership was later on expanded to 35 people. This debating forum came to be known as the Addis Ababa Ulama Unity Forum (AUUF).
The AUUF managed to strike a compromise between the two camps on some of the contentious issues, and for the rest they have agreed to accommodate or tolerate their occasions the need to establish an early warning system that diffuses the potential for conflict.
In fact, one of the suggestions made by the delegation to the Ethiopian government was to establish a Ministry of Religious Affairs which could serve as a platform for the various religious groups to foster religious tolerance and work together on common national issues. Federal Affairs is the government implementation of the suggestion made by the delegation is hard to ascertain but at least government policy seems to have been influenced by it. Before heading to Ethiopia, the delegation had organized an inter-faith dialogue with church leaders in the diaspora. The delegation also visited hotspots of recent religious conflicts where they deliberated on the root causes of the conflicts and jointly reflected on ways to promote peaceful co-existence.
Conclusion
Various case studies have shown the peace building role diaspora groups could play in their country of origin. The Ethiopian Muslim diaspora in North America and Europe and their transnational politics fits into this category. The Ethiopian Muslim diaspora are actively engaged in public reasoning in the form of disclosing the continued existence of structures of religious inequality and seeking acknowledgement from the dominant Christian establishment and the Ethiopian government. This public discourse is an important asset to promote religious tolerance and peaceful-co-existence, for the alternative is to resort to other (violent) mechanisms of redress. As McClure (2006:8) noted, 'the driving back of certain types of claims outside the sphere of public reason encourages the creation of counter-publics devoted to social destabilization and fragmentation rather than to political reformation'.
Avoiding the victimology trap, the Ethiopian Muslims diaspora are not stuck on past injustices but are engaged in reforming contemporary Ethiopian society for a better future. This is important not only for the Muslim community at home, whose identity politics lack coherence and legitimate leadership, but also for reforming the Ethiopian polity at large. The use of the rights language in reference to the country's constitution and international conventions is also an important asset in the discursive struggle with fringe radical groups that have adopted the language of violence in the politics of recognition. This reflects the new pattern of juridification of protest at a global scale (Eckert 2006) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
